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I ABSTRACT 
This paper follows the evolution of the personal grievance for unjustified 
dismissal, from its roots in the Common Law action for wrongful dismissal into its 
introduction into legislation and through to its current form in the Employment 
Relations Act. Throughout this time the term 'unjustified dismissal' has never been 
defined and so the substantive law in this area is Judge made. This paper therefore 
also regards the different approaches and interpretations that the Courts have taken to 
the term 'unjustified dismissal'. 
Though originally interpreted in a "benevolent" manner when first introduced 
m 1973, unjustified dismissals have since been increasingly interpreted in a more 
strictly contractual way, favouring the employer and the employment agreement. This 
has been seen in the test for an unjustified dismissal, which at present is whether the 
decision to dismiss was one that a fair and reasonable employer could have taken. It 
has yet to be seen whether the approach of the Court of Appeal will change under the 
Employment Relations Act, which has a significantly different object to its 
predecessor. 
In order to promote both the object of the Employment Relations Act and the 
purpose of personal grievance provisions, which is to provide employment protection, 
the test needs to be a neutral one. The ninety day limitation on raising a personal 
grievance must also be extended so as to provide an effective remedy for a person 
who has had their employment unjustifiably terminated. 
Word Count for this paper is 14, 599. 
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II INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 1970's employment legislation, the common law action of 
wrongful dismissal was the only option for workers who believed they had been 
unfairly dismissed. However, the wrongful dismissal action was severely limited in 
both its coverage and its remedies. It also proved to be inadequate in granting 
workers employment security. This meant that workers had to rely on their unions for 
support. 
During the 1960s the international community decided that workers were 
entitled to certain employment rights, including employment protection. These rights 
were encapsulated in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions. In 
the early 1970s the New Zealand government decided that legislation was needed to 
create a system to process personal grievances, particularly dismissals. Their first 
attempt in 1970 did little to change the situation for workers who felt that they had 
been unfairly dismissed. However, three years later the government created a process 
to redress personal grievances, including unjustified dismissals. 
Though subsequent legislation has greatly enlarged the number of workers 
covered by the personal grievance procedure, the core provisions have remained 
constant since 1987. Also, the concept of 'unjustified dismissal' has never been 
defined in legislation; rather it has been left up to the courts to determine. For this 
reason the substantive law in this area has been created by the courts. 
This paper will review the changes to the law of unjustified dismissal in New 
Zealand, both in legislation and in case law. The paper will also evaluate whether the 
current law is sufficient or is in need of change. To do this it must first be determined 
what the purpose of the personal grievance provisions are and what is trying to be 
achieved through them. 
A Purpose of Personal Grievance Provisions 
The reason for having personal grievance provisions is to protect the employee 
from being unjustifiably dismissed. The underlying rationale is employment 
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protection or employment security. However, as a concept employment security is 
controversial, drawing polar opinions on its relative value1• On the one hand there is 
the claim that employers should be able to run their business as they choose, because 
of the need for an economically efficient labour market. On the other there is the 
claim that employees invest much time and energy into their employment and that it 
therefore requires protection2. The employment relationship is a reciprocal 
relationship with both parties gaining something from it. However the employee is in 
a weaker position. This is because the employer has the ability to terminate the 
employee's employment, but the employee has no equivalent power over the 
employer. It could, however, be argued that the employee's power comes from their 
ability to disrupt the employer's business through strike action. 
Opponents of employment security argue that employers should be able to 
dismiss an employee without reasons on the contractual period of notice required, 
which is usually reasonably short. This is the approach traditionally taken by the 
common law3. Supporters of employment protection conversely argue that an 
employer should not be able to terminate an employee's employment without a good 
reason and after following a fair process. This is the approach taken in New Zealand 
and encapsulated in the ILO Convention 158 on the Termination of Employment at 
the Initiative of the Employer4• 
The argument for employment security appears stronger as the effect of a 
dismissal on the employer is far less than the effect on the employee. This is most 
apparent in the wages of the employee. While it may be an inconvenience, or even a 
financial burden, for the employer to continue to pay the wages of the employee for a 
time, it is far more severe on the employee who very likely relies on their wage as 
their sole source of financial income. Because of this economic need for an income a 
person's employment opportunities should not be unduly constrained or terminated 
because of unjustifiable conduct by the employer5. 
1 Robyn Mackay (ed) Employment Law Guide (4th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 212 
2 Mackay (ed), 1998, above, 212 
3 Mackay (ed), 1998, above, 213 
4 Mackay (ed), 1998, above, 213 
5 Mackay (ed), 1998, above, 213 
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Due to the precarious situation that an employee may find himself or herself in 
if the employment is "at will", there needs to be some form of employment protection. 
Clearly a balance must be struck between protecting employees from having their 
positions unfairly and unnecessarily taken from them, and the right of the employer to 
rid the company of workers who commit misconduct or do not have the capacity to 
perform the job. An employer should also retain the ability to structure their business 
as they so choose, however, if the employer does decide to make some employees 
redundant there should be compensation for the loss of their employment. This is 
more so the case because the loss of position is in no way connected with any 
misconduct or incapacity on the part of the employee. 
This paper therefore proceeds with the proposition that personal gnevance 
provisions are necessary for employment security, and that they are an important way 
of protecting the employee's employment and financial income from unjust 
interference. 
B Unjustified Dismissals 
The substantive law on unjustified dismissals has remained mostly constant 
since its introduction in 1973. The Employment Law Guide has set out the standard 
elements of an unjustified dismissal claim:6 
Having established that there is a dismissal the employer must show that the dismissal 
was justified. Justification has two elements, and the failure to prove either will result 
in the dismissal being held to be unjustifiable. First it must be shown that the 
substantive reasons for the dismissal were sufficient to justify the dismjssal. Second it 
must be shown that the procedure the employer followed in making the decision to 
dismiss was unfair. . .In practice, the two elements may merge 
Though relatively small, the changes that have been made in legislation and 
case law represent a significant difference to personal grievances. Recently this has 
been in the more restrictive interpretation of unjustified dismissals by the Court of 
Appeal. 
6 Mackay (ed) , 1998, above, 226 
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This paper will look at the progression of the unjustifiable dismissal through 
New Zealand legislation, from its introduction to its current state in the Employment 
Relations Act 2000. It will then cover judicial changes in interpretation of 
unjustifiable dismissals throughout that period. Most of the cases reviewed are Court 
of Appeal decisions as it has the most influence on the law of unjustified dismissals as 
the highest appellate court for employment cases. This paper will then go on to look 
at possible future changes to the provisions. 
III HISTORY 
A Wrongful Dismissal 
Before the introduction of the personal gnevance procedures, a dismissed 
worker had only two legal avenues: to gain the support of their union in order to 
acquire reinstatement or compensation for the worker, or to take a common law action 
for wrongful dismissal against their former employer7• Wrongful dismissal was an 
extremely limited action. It only provided a guarantee that an employee was given the 
period of notice provided for in their employment contract, or if none were provided, 
that a reasonable notice was given8• Payment in lieu of notice was accepted as an 
alternative to the working out of notice9. After the decision of Addis10, damages were 
limited to the amount that would have been paid had the required notice been given 11 • 
This action was therefore only helpful to those workers who had long notice 
periods in their contracts, or who were very highly paid and could therefore gain more 
for a payment of their contractual notice period. 
The wrongful dismissal action did not ensure a worker's employment was 
secure. An employer was under no obligation to give reasons for or to justify the 
7 Gordon Anderson "The Origins and Development of the Personal Grievance Jurisdiction in New 
Zealand" (1988) 13 NZJIR 257, 259 
8 Anderson, above, 259 
9 Anderson, above, 259 
10 Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd (1909) AC 488 
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dismissal 12. Therefore, as long as the requisite notice was given to the employee, they 
had no real opportunity of receiving more compensation through the common law. 
B ILO Conventions 
During the 1960's there was an increased appreciation of the inadequacies of 
the common law wrongful dismissal action 13. In 1963, the ILO decided that it was 
necessary to give greater protection to workers. This was encapsulated in the ILO 
Recommendation No 119 on the Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the 
Employer. Convention 158 and Recommendation 166 of 1982 have since superseded 
the 1963 Recommendation. 
1 Convention 158 provisions: 
Article 4 states that the employment of a worker may not be terminated unless 
there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of 
the worker or based on the operational requirements of the business. Article 5 gives 
reasons that do not constitute a valid reason for dismissal under Article 4, including 
union membership, sex, race or marital status. Article 7 provides that the worker must 
be given an opportunity to offer a defence before a dismissal. Article 8 states that 
where a worker believes that he or she has been unjustifiably dismissed they are 
entitled to appeal to an impartial body, and that the burden of proof must not fall on 
the worker alone (Article 9). 
The increase from a Recommendation to a Convention also shows the 
importance that the ILO places on employment security and the workers rights in 
relation to that employment 14 
C The Introduction of Personal Grievance Procedures into New Zealand 
With only a right to bring a wrongful dismissal action , New Zealand was 
becoming aware that the country was falling significantly behind the developments of 
11 Anderson, above, 259 
12 Anderson, above, 259 
13 Robyn Mackay (ed) Employment law Guide (5th ed, Butterworths, Well ington, 2001 ), 464 
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other nations by the beginning of the 1970s 15 • It had become apparent to the New 
Zealand government that changes to the current scheme were necessary. The first of 
these changes came in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 
1970, which introduced a procedure for the settlement of a personal grievance. The 
then Mnister of Labour, the Right Hon J R Marshall, stated that the reason for this 
was because 16: 
"These matters, particularly alleged wrongful dismissals are a constant source of 
industrial disputes leading to work stoppages. About 11 % of stoppages are caused 
by this type of grievance. One reason is the absence of a simple procedure, 
speedily available, for the handling of personal grievances" 
However, because the personal grievance was only for 'wrongful dismissals', 
workers were only covered for dismissals that were unlawful at common law 17 . This 
was, however, a conscious decision on behalf of the government to retain "the right of 
the employer to hire and fire" 18, though it was not what employers intended for the 
prov1s1ons. 
The 1970 amendment therefore offered little new protection to a worker who 
had been unfairly dismissed. However it was the first step in the creation of the 
personal grievance provisions. As Gordon Anderson notes, the introduction of 
personal grievance procedures had little to do with individual employment security, or 
compliance with ILO standards (neither of which were mentioned in the Ministers 
speech), but rather as a response to a political concern with the increasing number of 
strikes attributable to dismissal disputes 19. 
IV INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1973 (IRA) 
14 Anderson, above, 259 
15 Anderson, above, 257, e.g. by the 1960s countries such as France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain 
already had legislative protection for workers 
16 (10 September 1970) 368 NZPD 3127 
17 Anderson, above, 260 
18 (12 September 1970) 369 NZPD 4072 
19 Anderson, above, 261 
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A Legislative Changes 
The 1973 Act extended the personal grievance provisions to cover workers 
who had been unjustifiably dismissed or had any other unjustifiable action made 
against them by an employer (section 117(1)). Interestingly, no reason was given for 
the extension. However, it could be assumed that the change was necessary because 
the 1970 legislation did little to prevent the industrial unrest or provide the speedy 
resolution of disputes it was enacted for, as it did not substantially change the law. 
This new legislation offered greater protection to workers and was a great 
improvement on the previous legislation, though it was only a minor part of the Act, 
taking up just one section. 
The procedure for dealing with personal grievances (set out in section 117(4)) 
was very simple. It allowed for workers to initially raise their grievance with their 
immediate supervisor and to try to settle the problem individually. If this failed or 
was inappropriate in the circumstances, the worker had to raise the matter with his or 
her union representative. It was up to the representative to take the grievance up with 
the employer "if he considers there was some substance" in the grievance (section 
117(4)(c)). This severely limited the worker, as they did not have the right to raise the 
grievance with their employer unless their union representative believed that it was 
worthwhile. This also meant that the right to invoke the personal grievance 
procedures was vested in the worker's union, not in the workers themselves20. 
Although the Act did allow a right of appeal against the union's decision (s.117 (3A)). 
It was possible for the employees to bring a grievance themselves with the leave of 
the Industrial Court if they could show that they were unable to have their grievance 
dealt with because of a failure on the part of the union21 • 
The worker was further limited by the requirement that the worker be bound 
by an award or a registered agreement. This had the effect of excluding a 
considerable number of workers from the personal grievance provisions22. For 
20 Robyn Mackay (ed) Employment law Guide (5th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001), 469 21 Hori v NZ Forest Service [1978] ACJ 35, 39 per Judge Jamieson 
22 Anderson, above, 262 
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example many clerical workers were not covered, because they earned more than the 
relatively low maximum wage in the Clerical Workers Award, above which coverage 
ceased23 , and therefore had only the common law action for wrongful dismissal to fall 
back on. 
The position was softened a little by the fact that the Courts allowed for 
dismissed workers to join a union after their dismissal and make use of the grievance 
procedures24. However, this was only an issue between 1983 and 1985 when 
voluntary union membership was introduced25 . During the time of compulsory union 
membership this requirement was not a burden on the employee, but nor did it soften 
the impact of the requirement for coverage by an award. 
The remedies available were reimbursement for lost wages, reinstatement 
and/or compensation. This was a vast improvement on the common law action for 
wrongful dismissal, which allowed only compensation for the given or reasonable 
notice period. In particular the remedy of reinstatement was not usually available at 
common law26 and therefore created greater job security for workers by giving them 
the opportunity to be reinstated into their previous position. 
The definition of "worker" was limited under the Industrial Relations Act to 
any person of any age of either sex to do any work for hire or reward. The IRA left 
undefined the concept of 'unjustified', or even 'dismissal'. It was left up to the Courts 
to decide what constituted an unjustified dismissal. The legislation gave no 
indications as to what situations these provisions should cover or what actions were to 
be targeted. 
B Judicial Decisions on 'Unjustified' Dismissal 
With the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act the courts created the 
basic principles relating to unjustified dismissals. Firstly the courts distinguished the 
23 Anderson, above, 262 
24 Anderson, above, 263 
25 John Hughes Labour Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company ltd, Christchurch, 1990), 3928 26 Ogilvy & Mather (NZ) Ltd v Turner [1994] l NZLR 641,643 per Cooke P 
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new action for 'unjustified' dismissals from the narrower action for 'wrongful' 
dismissasl27 . In 1982 the Court of Appeal held that: 28 
"It is plain ... that the word 'unjustifiably' in s.117 (1) of the New Zealand Act is not 
confined to matters of legal justification. If it were so the section would add only a 
claim to reinstatement in the law." 
The Court then went on to give some guidance as to the definition of 
unjustified dismissals: 29 
"In the context of s.117 we think the word 'unjustified' should have its ordinary 
accepted meaning . . .Its integral feature is the word unjust - that is to say not in 
accordance with justice or fairness . A course of action is unjustifiable when that 
which is done cannot be shown to be in accordance with justice or fairness." 
Though the word 'unjust' has been described as having the connotation of 
"unfair, without due cause, unreasonable, improper, unwarranted or arbitrary"30, the 
Courts have never given a solid definition or detailed test for unjustified dismissals. 
The Court of Appeal considered that 'unjustified dismissal' could not be defined 
precisely as a matter of law and that whether a dismissal is unjustified must be 
considered "virtually as an issue of fact" 31 • For a concept such as unjustified 
dismissal it would be difficult to create a watertight test that can be used in every case 
without causing arbitrary decisions. In spite of this difficulty, Judge Williamson gave 
a non-exhaustive list in Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction of 
matters that should be taken into account: 32 
the conduct of the worker; the conduct of the employer; the history of the 
employment; the nature of the industry and its customs and practices; the terms of 
the contract (express, incorporated and implied); the terms of any other relevant 
agreements, and the circumstances of the di smissal. The Court also has regard to 
good industrial practice which includes some consideration of the moral and social 
27 For example Hori v NZ Forest Service [1978] ICJ 35 
28 Auckland City Council v Hennessey [1982] ACJ 699, 703 per Somers J (CA) 29 Auckla11d City Council v Hennessey [1982] ACJ 699, 703 per Somers J (CA) 30 Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction Co [1983] ACJ 653, 666 per Judge 
Williamson 
31 BW Bellis v Canterbury Hotel etc IUOW [1985] ACJ 956,960 (CA) 
32 Wellington Road Tra11sport, above, 666 
attitudes of the community. The Court considers ILO Recommendations and 
Conventions. The Court also has regard to its own earlier decisions and to the 
decisions of other Courts, both New Zealand and foreign." 
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The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower courts that they should refrain 
from laying down too early on or too rigidly defined principles as to the meaning of 
'unjustified' as each individual case must be treated on its merits33 . Later, Cooke P 
indicated that general rules were inappropriate where there are duties of fairness and 
reasonableness34. However commentators have criticised this approach because other 
courts in the same positions have established general principles to assist in the 
construction of vague statutory terminology35. 
The Court of Appeal stated that the Arbitration Court had given s.117 a 
benevolent construction and that since the Industrial Relations Act had the purpose of 
improving industrial relations (as provided in the long title) the Court of Appeal 
should not derogate in any way from that general approach36 . The Court went on to 
state that the issue is not whether the worker has established that he or she was 
unjustifiable dismissed, but whether the employer had shown that the dismissal was 
justified37 . This confirmed that the evidential burden was on the employer to justify 
the dismissal once the employee had raised the issue by showing that they had been 
dismissed. 
The Courts also confirmed that a constructive dismissal came within the 
concept of a dismissal for the purposes of the personal grievance provisions38 . That 
the dismissal must be carried out in a substantively and procedurally fair manner, so 
that at the time of the dismissal the employer had clear and reliable evidence, or had 
carried out a reasonable inquiry so as to support the decision to dismiss39. The Courts 
33 Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction Co [1982] ACJ 663,665 per Woodhouse 
P (CA) 
34 Marshall Cordner & Co v Canterbury Clerical Workers Union I UW [ 1986] 2 NZLR 431, 434 35 John Hughes Labour Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company Ltd, Christchurch, 1989) 1928-
9 
36 Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction Co, above, 666 (CA) 37 Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction Co, above, 666 (CA) 38 Auckland Shop Employees IUOW v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA) 39 Airline Stewards and Hostesses of NZ IUOW v Air NZ Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 549 (CA) 
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also stated that the justifiability of the dismissal is judged at the time the action of 
dismissal was taken40. 
The Court of Appeal later suggested that the requirement for fair and 
reasonable treatment might quite readily be found in "private contracts of employment 
not subject to the 1973 Act"41 . The reason given was that "fair and reasonable 
treatment is so generally expected today of any employer that the law may come to 
recognise it as an ordinary obligation in a contract of service"42. 
V LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 1987 (LRA) 
A Legislative Changes 
The 1987 Act created a much more extensive and comprehensive legislative 
system for personal grievances. Instead of a single section in the Act, as was the case 
under the IRA, the LRA dedicated a whole part to personal grievances, spanning 
twenty sections. Firstly the Labour Relations Act extended the definition of "worker" 
to include a home-worker and a person intending to work (section 2). The Act also 
set out the objects for the personal grievance provisions (section 209). The objects 
stated that the provisions were not limited to unjustifiable dismissals, that personal 
grievances were distinguishable from disputes of rights, that access to personal 
grievance provisions was a benefit of union membership and that the provisions were 
an alternative to a complaint made under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 or 
the Race Relations Act 1971. 
The personal grievance provisions were extended to cover discrimination, 
sexual harassment and duress (section 210). The Act also extended coverage to all 
union members, whether or not they were bound by an award or agreement. These 
changes had the potential to greatly increase the number of workers covered by the 
personal grievance procedures because many workers were not within the award 
40 Northern etc Butchers etc IUOW v Peach and Vienna Foods Ltd [1982] ACJ 379 41 Sir Ivor Richardson, 'The Role of the Court in Industrial Relations' (1987) 12 NZJIR 113, 117 42 Marlborough Harbour Board v Goulden [1985] 2 NZLR 378, 383 per Cooke J 
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system, such as the white-collar workers, managerial employees and the clerical 
workers mentioned above43 . The Labour Relations Act also carried over the principle 
of compulsory union membership from when it was reintroduced in 198544. 
The LRA also set out that a statement of reasons must be given for a dismissal 
(section 225), and that the primary remedy for an unjustified dismissal was to be 
reinstatement (section 228). 
The new legislation was much more descriptive and comprehensive than the 
personal grievance procedures under the IRA. However, like the Industrial Relations 
Act, the Labour Relations Act left undefined the term 'unjustified' and again the 
Courts were required to interpret the intentions of Parliament. As the Court of Appeal 
noted:45 
"We draw attention to the words "the worker has been unjustifiably dismissed" and 
would contrast them with "the worker's dismissal was unjustified" . If the latter 
words had been used in the Act there would be a narrow question simply whether on 
the facts as known to the employer at the time of the dismissal was justified. But the 
words of the section are different and must be applied by the Court. They are wider 
and require the employer to prove on the balance of probabilities that on the facts as 
they emerge ... the dismissal has been shown to be justifiable" 
B Judicial Comment On The New Legislation 
In an overview of the new legislation Richardson J stated that46 : 
"Clearly Parliament has departed from the common law approach not only in relation 
to procedures and remedies but also in formulating the basic concept of unjustifiable 
conduct within the employment relationship under the Act. The contract of 
employment cannot be equated with an ordinary commercial contract. It is a special 
relationship under which workers and employers have mutual obligations of 
confidence, trust and fair dealing. The statutory inquiry necessarily involves a 
43 Gordon Anderson "The Origins and Development of the Personal Grievance Jurisdiction in New 
Zealand" (1988) 13 NZJIR 257, 262 
44 John Hughes Labour Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company ltd, Christchurch, 1990), 3928 45 Airline Stewards etc IUW v Air New Zealand Ltd [1990) 3 NZLR 549,554 per Bisson J (CA) 46 Telecom South Ltd v Post Office Union [1992) l NZLR 275,285 
balancing of competing considerations. Those mutual obligations must respect on the 
one hand the importance to workers of the right to work and their legitimate interest in 
job security, and on the other hand the importance to employers of the right to manage 
and to make their own commercial decisions as to how to run their businesses. 
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Here Richardson J emphasised the balanced approach that the courts should take to 
the provisions under the Labour Relations Act. The Court of Appeal has recognised 
the conflicting interests of both parties as well as their common obligations of mutual 
trust and confidence, all of which these need to be considered in an unjustified 
dismissal action. 
C Judicial Decision on 'Unjustified' Dismissal 
There was little change between the Industrial Relations Act and the Labour 
Relations Act and decisions made under the new Act were in keeping with those of 
the previous legislation. In Airline Stewards etc IUW v Air New Zealand Lta'7 the 
Court of Appeal stated that: 48 
"We agree with the [Labour] Court that ' the real test is whether the employer has 
shown that the decision to dismiss was in the circumstances and at the time a 
reasonable and fair decision' . . . The decision must be looked at from two points of 
view, that is, fairness to the employer and fairness to the employee" 
Adding more detail to the meaning of an unjustified dismissal Richardson J stated49: 
"A dismissal is unjustifiable if it is not capable of being shown to be just in all the 
circumstances. Justifiability is directed at considerations of moral justice. Whether a 
dismissal is justifiable ca11 only be determined by considering and balancing the 
interests of worker a11d employer. It is whether what was done and how it was done, 
including what recompense was provided, is just and reasonable to both parties in all 
the circumstances including, of course, the reason for the dismissal. Where it does not 
meet that test and the primary remedy of reinstatement is not available, the awarding of 
compensation recognises the reality that the employment is at an end and life must go 
47 Airline Stewards etc IUW v Air New Zealand Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 549 (CA) 48 Airline Stewards etc IUW v Air New Zealand Ltd, above, 555-6 per Bisson J 49 Telecom South Ltd v Post Office Union, above, 285-6 
on. And a just and reasonable award must reflect the circumstances and the legitimate 
interests of both parties." (Own emphasis) 
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Both of these comments quotes emphasise the balance necessary between the interests 
of the employer and the employee, both before and after the dismissal takes place. 
The Court of Appeal restated its position that a definition of unjustified 
dismissal was not possible because it was always a matter of degree50. However the 
Court did go on to note that usually what is needed for a case of misconduct to justify 
a summary dismissal is "conduct that deeply impairs or is destructive of that basic 
confidence or trust that is an essential of the employment relationship"51 . The Court 
also stated that once it has been shown that the breach of trust was serious and of such 
a nature as to warrant a fair and reasonable employer deciding that the employee 
should be dismissed the Court may not then substitute its judgement as to what 
penalty should or should not actually have been imposed52 . Therefore once an 
employer could show that the decision to dismiss was one a fair and reasonable 
employer would have made, the court must accept the decision was justified, even if it 
would have also have been possible for the employer to make another decision. 
VI EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 (ECA) 
A Legislative Changes 
Under the Employment Contracts Act 'employees' were given the same 
definition as 'workers' under the Labour Relations Act. Although at the time that the 
Act was passed the Business Roundtable and Employers Federation argued that the 
personal grievance procedures should be abolished so that employers could return to 
their previous ability to hire and fire with little difficulty53, the 1991 Act in fact 
extended coverage to all workers by removing the requirement of union membership. 
50 Northern Distribution U11io11 v BP Oil NZ Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 483,487 (CA) 51 Northern Distribution Unio11 v BP Oil NZ Ltd, above, 487 per Hardie Boys J 51 Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil NZ Ltd, above, 488 per Hardie Boys J affirming the statement 
made in Read v Air New Zealand [1991] 3 ERNZ 139, 146 
53 Robyn Mackay (ed) Employment law Guide (5th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001), 463 
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Apart from this and some other relatively mrnor changes, the ECA virtually 
reproduced the personal grievance provisions of the LRA. 
With the removal of the union requirement, the right to bring a personal 
grievance was vested in the individual, not in their union. The Act required that every 
employment contract (both individual and collective) must include an effective 
procedure for the settling of a dispute. This extended coverage to more senior 
employees not previously protected54. The only limiting factor of the 1991 legislation 
was the requirement for the grievance to be raised within ninety days with the 
employer. This was a new provision, and one that distinguished the ECA from the 
LRA, as the LRA contained no equivalent statutory time limit. 
The ECA maintained the remedies of previous legislation, but removed the 
preference for reinstatement. This left the remedy totally at the discretion of the 
Court. 
B Judicial Comment On The New Legislation 
In the 1995 of Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck the Court of Appeal stated that "the 
1991 Act did not in general curtail the personal grievance provisions which in one 
form or another have been part of New Zealand statute law since 1970"55 . The Court 
noted that a feature of the ECA is its extension of personal grievance jurisdiction by 
making the personal grievance procedure "available under every employment 
contract, no matter how senior the employee and no matter whether or not he or she is 
a union member"56 . While it is true that the ECA in fact extended the personal 
grievance provisions by granting the right to bring an unjustified dismissal action in 
the employees themselves, the ECA did nonetheless curtail the grievance procedures 
by enacting the ninety-day rule. This severely limited the ability of an employee to 
get redress because if they failed to raise the grievance within ninety days, except in 
rare circumstances, they would be left only with the common law action for wrongful 
dismissal. The Court then went on to state that " the emphasis on efficiency and 
54 Mackay (ed), 2001, above, 469 
55 Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck (1995] l NZLR 158, 163 per Cooke P (CA) 
56 Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck, above, 163 per Cooke P 
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market forces is thus accompanied and in a sense balanced by a reaffirmation and 
broadening of the scope of personal grievance remedies"57 . 
In 1998 in the case of Aoraki the Court of Appeal, under the presidency of Sir 
lvor Richardson, stated accurately that the 1991 Act "represents a substantial 
departure from the collectivist principles of previous industrial relations legislation in 
favour of a model of free contractual bargaining"58 . The Court went on to note that 
the personal grievance procedures were extended to cover all employees, but that "the 
context in which they operate is sharply changed by the emphasis in the 1991 Act on 
contractual freedom"59. However the Court then stated that the "personal grievance 
provisions are part of the overall balance reflecting the special characteristics of 
employment contracts and under which... employees and employers have mutual 
obligations of confidence trust and fair dealing"60. While it seems that Richardson P 
very aptly described the Act in the description of free bargaining, the description of 
the overall balance of the Act appears, with respect, to be somewhat of an anomaly. It 
is very difficult to see how the Act does in fact balance these two things. The removal 
of the union membership requirement seems more likely to have been done primarily 
to take power away from the trade unions by investing that power in the individuals, 
not to extend the personal grievance provisions to everyone. The Court of Appeal, in 
fact, uses the philosophy and principles of the ECA to limit the scope of the personal 
grievance provisions for employees. 
Though both Judges noted the extension of the personal grievance provisions, 
it is somewhat difficult to how they were then able to come to such completely 
different interpretations of what the meaning of the Act was. Under the presidency of 
Lord Cooke, the Court of Appeal gave a more liberal interpretation to the ECA, as 
seen in decisions such as Brighouse, whereas under the presidency of Sir Richardson 
the Court of Appeal gave very conservative interpretations to the Act, seen in such 
cases such as Aoraki. 
57 Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck, above, 163 per Cooke P 
58 Aoraki C01poratio11 v McGavin [1998) l ERNZ 601,611 (CA) 
59 Aoraki Corporation v McGavin, above, 612 
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C Judicial Decision on 'Unjustified' Dismissal 
The greatest distinction in decisions came after the introduction of the ECA 
and a change of direction by the Court of Appeal towards the later part of the 1990s. 
The new Act was more conservative, adopting a more contractual approach to the 
employment relationship. This conservative approach was only picked up by the 
courts in relation to unjustified dismissals at a later date. There was clearly a shift in 
the Court of Appeal as to the meaning of justification over the nine years that the 
ECA was legislation. In 1992 the Court stated in Northern Distribution Union v BP 
Oil NZ Ltd that61 
"In the end, the question is essentially whether the decision to dismiss was one 
which a reasonable and fair employer would have taken in the particular 
circumstances" 
It was therefore up to the Court to determine whether a fair and reasonable 
employer would have dismissed the employee. If dismissal was just one of the 
options open to the employer, it will not necessarily mean that the Court will decide 
that the decision was justified62. 
In Brig house v Bilderbeck Cooke P adopted Richardson J' s statement quoted 
above from Telecom South, which related that an unjustified dismissal must be 
determined by considering and balancing the interests of the worker and the 
employer63 . In this case the Court held that employees may have a right to 
compensation for redundancy, even where none was provided for in their employment 
contract. However in the later decisions of Aoraki and Thwaites64 the Court took a 
more restrictive approach to personal grievances and extended what was acceptable 
behaviour by the employer. 
60 Aoraki Corporation v McGavin, above, 612 
61 Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil NZ Ltd [ 1992] 3 ERNZ 483, 487 per Hardie Boys J (CA) -
though was decided under the Labour Relations Act 
62 Robyn Mackay (ed) Employment Law Guide (4th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 227 63 Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck [1995] l NZLR 158, 166 per Cooke P (CA) 64 NZ Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites (17 May 2000) Court of Appeal CA 10/99 
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In W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram65 the Court of Appeal emphasised that the 
opinion of the court should not supplant that of the employer66 . Gault J went on to 
state that even if the decision seemed harsh, the court should only decide whether the 
dismissal was an option open to the employer acting fairly and reasonably67 . The 
Court stated that68 : 
"The court has to be satisfied that the decision to dismiss was one which a 
reasonable and fair employer could have taken. Bearing in mind there may be 
more than one correct response open to a fair and reasonable employer, we prefer 
to express this in terms of "could" rather than "would"." 
This modifies the BP Oil test stated above and widens the available actions of an 
employer that will be found to be justified. In doing so it narrows the provisions of 
unjustified dismissal and what will be held to be unjustified. 
Although the test seems to be very broad and relatively vague, the courts have 
put restrictions on what the presiding judge should take into consideration. Thomas J 
pointed out in Hagg that it was wrong for the Employment Court Judge to "apply a 
broad test of 'fairness"' because such as approach results in the court not focusing on 
the critical matters of whether there was a dismissal and whether that dismissal was 
unjustified and the contractual basis of the employee's employment69 . 
D Was the Court of Appeal's Reinterpretation Justified? 
Though the Employment Contracts Act changed the focus of labour law onto 
the contract made between the employer and employee, the personal grievance 
provisions remained largely the same as under the Labour Relations Act. John 
Hughes noted that where new legislation re-enacts the provisions of the earlier 
legislation that it is replacing, it is assumed that Parliament was aware of the courts 
65 W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram (3 May 2001) Court of Appeal CA 140/00 
66 W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram, above, 17 per Gault J 
67 W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram, above, 17 per Gault J 
68 W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram, above, 13 per Gault J 
69 Principle of Auckland College of Education v Hagg [ 1997) 2 NZLR 537, 555 per Thomas J (CA) 
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interpretation of those prov1s1ons, and by not changing them, was endorsing that 
interpretation 70. 
According to this approach therefore when Parliament enacted the 
Employment Contracts Act it was endorsing the approach that the courts had taken in 
interpreting unjustified dismissals. The changes that the Employment Contracts Act 
made to personal grievances did not affect the substantive Jaw on unjustified 
dismissals, but rather extended the personal grievance coverage to certain workers not 
previously covered71 . The other changes affected only procedural matters72 . The 
significant changes that the Employment Contracts Act made to previous legislation 
was to the negotiation of employment contracts, including whether to have 
representatives and the right of the parties to choose the type of contract73 . These 
changes are encapsulated in Part II of the Employment Contracts Act. 
In the past the Court of Appeal were innovative in employment matters and 
were supportive of the liberal approach taken by the lower courts to the legislation 74 . 
However, the Court of Appeal has recently taken "an increasingly orthodox approach 
to labour law"75 . The orthodox approach tends to favour a pro-employer view of the 
employment relationship and to see employment in purely contractual terms76. This 
has been particularly the case in relation to redundancy cases. 
Richardson J's comments in Aoraki quoted above, that the context in which 
the personal grievance operate is "sharply changed by the emphasis in the 1991 Act 
on contractual freedom"77 , seem less convincing given that the provisions themselves 
were changed very little since the Labour Relations Act. There seems no justification 
therefore for the Court's modification of the BP Oil test made in Oram, as the 
personal grievance provisions had not substantially changed. Had Parliament 
70 John Hughes "The Employment Court, 'Judicial Activism' and the Coalition Agreement" (1997) 
28(1) CWILJ 167, 187 
71 Gordon Anderson "Interpreting the Employment Contracts Act: Are the Courts Undermining the 
Act?" (1997) 28(1) CWILJ 117,135 
72 Anderson, 1997, above, 135 
73 Anderson, 1997, above, 125 
74 For example Brig house and Hennessey 
75 Anderson, 1997, above, 118 
76 Anderson, 1997, above, 118 
77 Aoraki Corporation v McGavin [1998] l ERNZ 601,612 (CA) 
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intended to grant employers greater freedoms in dismissing employees then the 
personal grievance provisions should have been so amended. 
Therefore, while it may have been correct for the Court of Appeal to change 
its approach to areas of labour law that were clearly changed by the Employment 
Contracts Act, there does not appear to have been any reason for such an approach to 
have been taken with the unjustifiable dismissal provisions. Parliament did not 
abolish the personal grievance procedures as requested by the new right78, and there 
was no introduction to employment "at-will"79. There is a strong argument that the 
Court should have adopted different approaches for different parts of the Act80. The 
Court of Appeal should have maintained the Courts earlier decisions. 
VII EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 2000 (ERA) 
A Legislative Changes 
The Employment Relations Act has extended the coverage of the personal 
grievance provions mostly through the widening of the definition of 'employee' and 
limitation on the use of fixed term contracts. The definition of 'employee' extends on 
the basic form used since the LRA, and now allows the courts to determine the true 
nature of the relationship to decide whether or not the person is an 'employee' for the 
purposes of the Act, irrespective of the labels the parties had previously given 
themselves. This should extend the coverage of the personal grievance provisions to 
people who are employees in all but title, for example those employed as 
'independent contractors' who are in reality employees. Previously these employees 
would not have been covered, because of the strict contractual approach taken by the 
Court of Appeal 81 . This was introduced to try to stop employers employing people 
under different titles so as to limit or absolve themselves of liability under the 
personal grievance provisions. 
78 This term is used as shorthand for the groups such as the Business Round Table and Employers 
Federation who hold neo-classical economic beliefs. 
79 Anderson, 1997, above, 117 
80 Anderson, 1997, above, 124 
81 TNT Worldwide Express ( NZ) Ltd v Cunningham [ 1993) 3 NZLR 681 (CA) 
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The most recent labour relations legislation has not affected the range of 
employee access to the personal grievance procedures, but has changed the process 
for resolving the grievance. The 2000 legislation abolished the common law action 
for wrongful dismissal for employees covered by the personal grievance procedures. 
Although, as the personal grievance procedures offer so much more to a dismissed 
worker, it is not in reality a large loss for most employees' ability to gain 
compensation. 
The ERA extends the meanmg of personal gnevance to cover racial 
discrimination, and includes a list of exceptions in relation to discrimination (section 
106), for example where it is done for religious purposes. 
Reinstatement has been reintroduced as the primary remedy available for an 
unjustified dismissal. The ERA has also included a section that sets out that 
compensation will be reduced if there is contributory behaviour by the employee. 
However, employees are still limited in their right to bring an action by section 
114, which reiterates the ECA section 33, that a personal grievance must be raised 
within ninety days. This severely limits an employee's ability to bring an action. 
This issue will be returned to later. 
1. Fixed Term Contracts 
In order to restrict the use of fixed term contracts, which limited or absolved 
employers of responsibility under the personal grievance provisions, the ERA 
introduced section 66. The new section provides that fixed term contracts can only be 
used when there is a legitimate need for one, such as when the position is only 
available for a fixed period of time. The explanation for the original clause in the 
Employment Relations Bill was that it was: 82 
82 Questions to officials from the Department of Labor in letter from Hon. Richard Prebble to Graham 
Kelly, Chair of the Employment and Accident Insurance Legislation Committee, dated 28 April 2000, 
as quoted in John Hughes , Paul Roth and Gordon Anderson, Personal Grievances (loose-leaf, 
Butterworths, Wellington) para 3.27 (last updated 30 June 2002) 
" . .. intended to stop the use of fixed tern contracts as a device to effect termination 
without responsibility and to deny employees access to employment protection such 
as the personal grievance provisions ... [the section] is also intended to prevent the 
situation of precarious employment, where the employee is employed on a series of 
fixed term contracts that are continuously rolled over ... " 
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The implementation of section 66 overrides the decision in Hagg, which 
allowed for rolling over fixed term contracts and held that the expiry of a fixed term 
contract was not a dismissal and therefore could not be an unjustified dismissal. 
However it does not confirm whether or not the expiry of a fixed term contract that 
cannot be justified under section 66 will constitute an unjustified dismissal. John 
Hughes suggests that if the fixed term contract cannot be justified and the expiry of 
the contract is the only reason why the employer is terminating the employment 
relationship, the person will be able to claim that it was an unjustified dismissal83 . 
Section 66 also brings New Zealand legislation more into line with ILO 
Convention 158, Article 4, which states that there must be valid reasons for the 
termination of an employee's employment. 
B Judicial Decision on 'Unjustified' Dismissal 
Although the ERA has changed the shift away from the employment contract 
to the employment relationship and has given the key principles of good faith and 
fairness, it has yet to be seen whether the Court of Appeal will change its decisions on 
what is to be accepted as an unjustified dismissal. 
The only case that has been appealed to the Court of Appeal under the 2000 
legislation is Coutts Cars ltd v Baguley. That case maintained that the redundancy 
decisions of Aoraki and Thwaites should still "provide guidance on the applicable 
principles" as the new legislation did not introduce any significantly different 
obligations that the courts have not already placed on the parties to an employment 
contract84. The Court stated that they "did not find in the new provisions a warrant to 
introduce into what is still a contractual relationship terms and conditions the parties 
83 Hughes, Roth and Anderson, above, para 3.27 
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have not agreed to"85 . If this is indicative of all unjustified dismissal cases the new 
legislation may make little difference to employees who have been unjustifiably 
dismissed. 
Although it has also been noted that in both the pre and post Employment 
Contracts Act decisions emphasis was laid on the interpretation of the personal 
grievance procedures in the wider context of the aims of the legislation86. Following 
this reasoning, the Court of Appeal should take a more liberal approach to personal 
grievances in line with the aims of the 2000 legislation. However the recent decision 
of Coutts Cars v Baguley87 shows that the Court of Appeal is maintaining its 
conservative approach to redundancy personal grievances. 
C Should the Court of Appeal Take a New Approach to Unjustified 
Dismissals? 
If the Court of Appeal was not justified in changing their approach under the 
Employment Contracts Act, it appears that the Court would be even less justified in 
continuing with that interpretation under the Employment Relations Act. However, it 
could be argued that because Parliament re-enacted the personal grievance provisions 
from the ECA they were endorsing the approach that the Court of Appeal had taken 
under the previous legislation. 
However, Parliament did enact another provision, which may give guidance 
as to the approach that they intended the Court of Appeal to take. In 2000 section 216 
(b) was added to the legislation. It states that the Court of Appeal must have regard to 
the "object of this Act and the objects of the relevant Parts of this Act". The stated 
object of the Act being to "build productive employment relationships through the 
promotion of mutual trust and confidence in all aspects of the employment 
environment and of the employment relationship"88 . This is markedly different from 
84 Coutts Cars Ltd v Baguley [2002] 2 NZLR 533, 545 per Gault J (CA) 
85 Coutts Cars Ltd v BaguLey, above, 545 
86 Mackay (ed), 2001, above, 469 
87 Coutts Cars v Baguley (21 December 2001) Court of Appeal CA 102/01 
88 Employment Relations Act 2000 Section 3(a) 
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the object of the Employment Contracts Act which was to promote an efficient labour 
market. 
If the Court of Appeal changes its approach in regard to unjustified 
dismfasals in line with the object of the ERA, a more liberal interpretation will result. 
It has yet to be seen whether section 216(b) will make a difference to the Courts 
approach. 
VIII JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSALS 
"The concept of unjustifiable dismissal which gives rise to a personal grievance is a 
creature of statute. Its elements are accordingly a question of statutory interpretation"89 
A Unjustified by whose standard? 
In the earlier decisions it was held that "in the ultimate, the test of justification 
... is the opinion of the court"90 . This infers that a neutral, reasonable person test was 
being used to establish whether or not a dismissal was justifiable91 . However, this 
later changed to whether it "was open for a reasonable and fair employer to do in the 
particular circumstances"92. This moved the standard away from a reasonable person, 
and on to a fair and reasonable employer. 
However, in recent Court of Appeal cases the Court appears to have watered 
down the 'reasonable standard' by making the acceptable standard broader, which 
would mean that more actions would be encompassed within the options open to a fair 
and reasonable employer. 
This is quite a large move away from the court's opinion as being the most 
important one. It has yet to be seen, however whether the reasonable employer 
89 Ark Aviation v Newton [2002] 2 NZLR 145, 147 per McGrath J (CA) 
90 Wellington Road Transport, above, 666 per Judge Williamson 
91 Mackay(ed),2001,above,536 
92 BP Oil v Northern Distribution [1989) 3 NZLR 580,582 per Cooke P 
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standard will change under the 2000 legislation, which arguably expects more from 
employers through its aims and objectives than previous legislation has. 
There appears to have been a move towards the United Kingdom approach of 
the "reasonable employer" as the standard used in the test for whether or not a 
dismissal is unjustified93 . The United Kingdom courts use the 'range of reasonable 
responses' test to determine whether the dismissal was unfair or not94 . If the dismissal 
was within a band of reasonable responses to the employee's conduct that a 
reasonable employer might have adopted, the dismissal will usually be found to have 
been fair95 . It has yet to be seen whether the New Zealand courts will move away 
from this approach under the new employment legislation. 
In W & H Newspapers ltd v Oram96 the Court of Appeal emphasised that the 
opinion of the court should not supplant that of the employer97 . Although this was 
settled law and held to be the correct approach to unjustified dismissal cases in BP Oil 
where Hardie Boys J stated that98: 
"The factors the [Labour] Court identified were at best mitigating factors: in the 
sense that they were factors an employer might take into account in deciding whether 
despite the conduct being such as to justify summary dismissal , the worker should 
nonetheless cot be dismissed . But for the court to enter upon that territory was to 
usurp the responsibility and prerogative of the employer." 
The move away from the Courts opinion of whether the dismissal was justified 
and the fact that the Court has stated that it should not supplant its view for that of the 
employer means that more weight is given to the employer's decision than was 
previously given by the Courts. The emphasis on a fair and reasonable employer 
"incorporates a distorting element into the test of justification"99. Commentators have 
suggested that bias towards employer standards has the effect of discounting the 
93 Gordon Anderson "The Origins and Development of the Personal Grievance Jurisdiction in New 
Zealand" (1988) 13 NZJIR 257,267 
94 Lord Mackay of Clashfern (ed) Halsbury 's Laws of England (4th ed, Butterworths, London, 2000 
reissue) 448 
95 Lord Mackay (ed), above, 448 
96 W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram (3 May 2001 ) Court of Appeal CA 140/00 
91 W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram, above, 17 per Gault J 
98 Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil NZ Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 483, 487-8 per Hardie Boys J (CA) 
99 Robyn Mackay (ed) Employment law Guide (5th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001), 537 
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effects of the dismissal on the employee, and that the most balanced approach is that 
of Wellington Road Transport v Fletcher, that the Court must ultimately decide in its 
opinion whether it was a justified dismfasal 100. 
Commentators have criticised the approach of the Courts as being part of a 
general tendency in Common Law countries to interpret employment contracts and 
statutes on the basis that the correct perspective is that of the employers 101 • If the 
purpose of personal grievance provisions is to offer greater employment protection for 
employees then the employer's perspective cannot be the correct one to take. The 
Court should always be the ultimate judge of whether the decision to dismiss was a 
fair and reasonable one to take in the circumstances. 
B "Harsh but Fair" Decisions 
The concept of the "harsh but fair" decisions has been in New Zealand case 
law since the 1980s. There followed a string of cases which stated that though a 
decision to dismiss appeared to be harsh it was nonetheless open to the employer to do 
and therefore was not an unjustified dismissal. 
The latest of these cases was the decision of Oram. In the Oram decision 
Gault J stated "[the] dismissal may have seemed harsh, but the correct issue is 
whether it was open to the employer, acting fairly and reasonably, to have seen that as 
a reasonable response to Mr Oram's conduct". 
It is interesting that in Tasman Paper Pulp Co Ltd v Hei Hei 102 Judge Colgan 
stated that is was not possible to have a 'harsh but fair' dismissal as the legislation at 
the time (the ECA) prohibited "harsh and unconscionable behaviour" 103. In that 
decision Judge Colgan denied that a dismissal was within the reasonable range of 
options open to an employer. 
100 Mackay (ed), 2001, above, 537 
101 Mackay (ed), 2001, above, 537 
102 Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Ltd v Hei Hei (23 May 2000 Employment Court Auckland AC 
39/00) 
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There is no doubt that this is a difficult area and that a balance is needed 
between the conflicting sides. On the one hand employees require employment 
security and it should not be acceptable for an employee to loose their position for a 
seemingly trivial matter that the courts find was justified even though a harsh 
decision. However, if the action of an employee, however trivial, has been sufficient 
as to destroy the trust and confidence necessary for an employment relationship, the 
employer should not be forced to retain the employee in their employ. 
If a court decides that the action taken was not within the range open to a fair 
and reasonable employer in the circumstances, will the court then be substituting its 
own view for that of the employer? If this is the case, though according to Oram the 
court should not substitute its own view, does the Court in fact mean that the court 
must only supplant the view of the reasonable employer with that of the actual 
employer? It appears that in looking at whether the decision to dismiss was within the 
range of options open to an employer acting fairly and reasonably in all the 
circumstances it will be difficult to do without the Court supplanting their own views. 
This can be seen in decisions such as Tasman Pulp where Judge Colgan stated that Mr 
Hei Hei's misconduct was insufficiently serious to warrant dismissal as a fair and 
reasonable consequence. 
In Auckland Local Authorities IUOW v Northland ARB Goddard CJ stated in 
relation to harsh decisions that: 104 
"There are many cases in which the Court refuses to disturb an employer's decision 
to dismiss even if other alternatives were available to the employer because there 
may be a wide range of decisions available to a reasonable and fair employer. But 
that is not to say that the Court will never substitute its own view where it considers 
that dismissal was inappropriate to the gravity of the offence or offences committed 
- in other words, that it constitutes harsh treatment. It is precisely the function of the 
Court. .. to adjudicate on whether the circumstances of a particular case are such that 
it can be said of them that the dismissal was in those circumstances justifiable or 
otherwise" 
103 John Hughes, Paul Roth and Gordon Anderson, Personal Grievances (loose-leaf, Butterworths, 
Wellington) para 3.36 (last updated 30 June 2002) 
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The current state of allowing 'harsh but fair' dismissals also fails to satisfy 
ILO Convention 158 where it is stated that employment should only be terminated on 
valid grounds connected with the conduct or capacity of the worker. If the matter is 
only a trivial one it would be likely to be insufficient for this Convention. For 
example, using the facts from Tasman Pulp where Mr Hei Hei was dismissed after 
being 40 minutes late for work, though he did not cause any damage, harm or 
potential injury to his workmates. The fact of being forty minutes late is a trivial 
matter, neither sufficient to break the trust and confidence of the employment 
relationship nor connected with the conduct nor capacity of the worker. For this 
tardiness Mr Hei Hei should at most have been given a written warning, not a 
summary dismissal. 
As Judge Colgan noted a "harsh" dismissal is unlikely to be a fair and 
reasonable one and is therefore likely to be unjustifiable 105 . A fair and reasonable 
employer should not make harsh dismissals. It is incompatible with being fair and 
reasonable. 
C New Zealand and International standards 
ILO Convention 158 sets out the minimum acceptable standards for protection 
against unjustified termination of employment 106. Although New Zealand has not 
ratified this convention it should nonetheless be used as one of the factors to take into 
account when interpreting the law 107 . The Court of Appeal has endorsed the use of 
international instruments in aiding the interpretation of law 108. Therefore the fact that 
New Zealand has not ratified Convention 158 should not mean that it is irrelevant in 
the interpretation of unjustified dismissals. 
104 Auckland Local Authorities IUOW v North/and Area Health Board [1991] 2 ERNZ 215, 222 105 Tasman Pulp and Paper Company Ltd v Hei Hei (23 May 2000 Employment Court Auckland AC 
39/00), Appendix 1, Judge Colgan 
106 Robyn Mackay (ed) Employment Law Guide (4th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 216 107 Mackay, 1998, above, 216 
108 Tavira v Minister of !111111igratio11 [ 1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) - found that the Minister was not 
entitled to ignore international instruments, also £ketone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 
783 (CA) - found that international conventions can be used in the appropriate circumstances. Though 
note that later cases have been less enthusiastic about the use of international instruments. 
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Over the previous 29 years legislative changes have brought New Zealand law 
more into line with the ILO standards. However it seems that judicial decisions on 
unjustified dismissals have not increased New Zealand's compliance with 
international conventions. As the Chief Judge noted of the Court of Appeal's decision 
in Oram that misconduct need not be proved, it is a far way from the full appeal 
contemplated by Convention 158 109. The recent Court of Appeal decisions have not 
increased an employee's job security, but have conversely made it easier for an 
employer to terminate an employee's employment. This is because the Court is now 
accepting a dismissal as being justified if it were an option that a fair and reasonable 
employer could have taken, even if the decision to dismiss was harsh 110• 
Though Parliament has not put as much emphasis on Convention 158 as it has 
on Conventions 87 and 98, which are included in the object of the Act as being 
promoted by the Act, Convention 158 should nonetheless be used to interpret 
unjustified dismissals in New Zealand, and to bolster employment protection. 
D The Court of Appeal 
Most industrial disputes are settled before they get to court, even less are 
appealed from the Employment Tribunal to the Employment Court and fewer still go 
on to the Court of Appeal. However, it is the highest of these courts that has the 
greatest impact on the interpretation of industrial relations legislation. 
In 1987 Sir Ivor Richardson wrote an article about the role of the Court of 
Appeal in industrial relations. His Honour stated that 111 : 
All in all, my impression is that the Court of Appeal has had a distinctly limited 
influence on the interpretation and application of the industrial relations legislation. 
That may reflect a particularly cautious approach on the part of the court or, as some 
might say, an unwillingness to respond to social change in this area. It may even 
suggest that the specialist court arrangements are working particularly well. In any 
'
09 Peterson v BOT of Buller High School from John Hughes, Paul Roth and Gordon Anderson, 
Personal Grievances (loose-leaf, Butterworths, Wellington) para 3.38 (last updated 30 June 2002) 110 See W & H Newspapers Ltd v Oram 
111 
Sir I vor Richardson, 'The Role of the Court in Industrial Relations', (1987) 12 NZJIR 113, 117 
event it seems consonant with the scheme and policy of the legislation that a court 
functioning as an appellate and review body on matters of law only should have a 
low, non-activist profile. 
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Since this article was written the Court of Appeal has taken on a much more 
active role in shaping the Jaw of industrial relations in New Zealand. The approach 
of the Court of Appeal under the Industrial Relations Act was reasonably liberal, 
suggesting, even that the duties of procedural fairness required under the Act may also 
be imputed into employment contracts not covered by the Act, and that the benevolent 
interpretation taken by the Arbitration Court should not be derogated from. This 
approach to industrial legislation continued under the Labour Relations Act, as 
evidenced by the statement quoted above by Richardson J that a balancing act was 
necessary between the legitimate rights of an employee to employment security and 
the rights of an employer to organise their business as they so choose. 
Initially under the Employment Contracts Act the Court continued to actively 
aid the development of the industrial legislation with decisions such as Brighouse v 
Bilderbeck, which gave employees the right to compensation, even if none were 
provided in their contract of employment. However, under the later decision of 
Aoraki v McGavin the Court of Appeal took a more restrictive approach, overturning 
part of Brighouse and more strictly following a contractual approach to the legislation. 
It has yet to be seen how the Court of Appeal will deal with the new employment 
legislation for conduct and capacity cases, though it has been seen that for redundancy 
cases the Court's approach has not changed from that taken under the Employment 
Contracts Act. In any event it is clear that the Court has not had a limited influence 
on in the interpretation and application of industrial legislation, but quite the opposite 
has taken place. 
It has yet to be seen what to what extent the Court of Appeal will use s.216 (b) 
for the interpretation of unjustified dismissals. By looking at the object of the Act and 
the object of the personal grievance provisions a more generous interpretation should 
be given. 
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IX PARAMETERS OF AN UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSAL 
A Requirements of a Dismissal 
In order to have an unjustified dismissal, a dismissal must in fact have taken 
place. However, it is sometimes difficult to know whether or not a 'dismissal' has 
occurred. This is particularly the case when the employee has resigned from their 
position, and so prima facie were not dismissed from their employment. However, 
the courts have long recognised that a dismissal includes a constructive dismissal, and 
therefore an action for unjustified dismissal will not be denied simply because the 
employee resigned. 
In 1985 the Court of Appeal held that constructive dismissals include, but are 
not limited to, cases where 112: 
a) An employer gives an employee a choice between resigning and 
being dismissed; 
b) An employer has followed a course of conduct with the deliberate 
and dominant purpose of coercing an employee to resign; and/or 
c) A breach of duty by the employer causes an employee to resign . 
Where a constructive dismissal has taken place the employee's resignation 
will be treated as a dismissal by the employer. This will mean that an employee can 
make a personal grievance claim for unjustified dismissal having fulfilled the 
requirement of having been dismissed. The two concepts are sometimes placed 
together in a case so that the employee is claiming a constructive unjustified dismissal 
or an unjustified (constructive) dismissal. 
However, just because an employee feels that they have been forced to resign , 
it will not necessarily follow that they have been constructively dismissed, or 
unjustifiable dismissed. For example where misconduct on the part of the employee 
leads to that employee being requested to transfer there may be no constructive 
11 2 Auckland etc Shop Employees IUOW v Wool worths (NZ) ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372, 374-5 per Cooke J 
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dismissal 113. Or where the employer acts on an honest and reasonable belief that the 
person is not in an emotionally fit state to work there may be no constructive 
dismissal 114• 
The Court of Appeal has held that an employee may not use the possible 
future conduct of an employer as causing their resignation 115 . Also, where there has 
been a genuine resignation not forced by the behaviour of the employer there will be 
no constructive dismissal. 
What therefore has been held to constitute a constructive dismissal has been 
where the employer failed to provide a safe workplace 116, where there have been false 
accusations of misconduct made against the employee' 17, or where there has been a 
unilateral variation of the employment contract by the employer' 18. There may be 
occasions where the dismissal of the employee was justified because that person was 
no longer fit to work, however if that unfitness to work can be attributed to a breach 
of the employer's duties, that dismissal will be unjustified 119• 
B Procedural Fairness 
Often what makes a dismissal unjustifiable is that it was not carried out in a 
procedurally fair manner. By 1982 in the case of Hennessey the Court of Appeal 
required that a dismissal must be carried out in a substantially and procedurally fair 
manner 120. 
113 Northern Clerical etc Workers /VOW v Rivers/ea Trading Society Ltd [1986] ACJ 586 114 Cole v Signwise Ltd 29/5/96, CEC13/96 
115 Business Distributors Ltd v Patel 13/8/01, CA220/00 
116 Auckland etc Local Authorities Officers' I VOW v Auckland Electric Power Board [ 1992] 2 ERNZ 
87 
117 Parlane v NZ Police [1991] 3 ERNZ 721, STAMS v De11hards Bakeries Co (Nol) [1991] 3 ERNZ 
939 
118 NZ Performance & E11tertainme11t Workers Union v 93FM lndepende11t Broadcasting Co Ltd [ 1991] 
l ERNZ 774 
119 Comissioner of Police v Cartwright [2000] 2 ERNZ l 06 (CA) 
120 Auckla11d City Council v Hennessey [1982] ACJ 699, 703 per Somers J (CA) 
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Phillip Bartlett and others identify the four elements required for procedural 
fairness 121 . The first requirement is warning. The employer must warn the employee 
of the conduct (unless it is serious misconduct warranting a summary dismissal) and 
require the employee to improve his or her conduct. At this point the employee 
should be made aware that the employer is considering dismissal if there is not 
sufficient improvement. The second requirement is an investigation. The employer 
must carry out an investigation of the relevant facts before terminating the 
employment of the employee. The findings from the investigations should be 
communicated to the employee. The third requirement is that reasons be given to the 
employee for the dismissal. This must be done prior to the employment being 
terminated. Finally the fourth requirement is the employer gives the employee the 
opportunity to be heard. The employee must be given a real opportunity to be heard 
and to offer an explanation for the conduct before the decision to dismiss is made. 
Goddard CJ also set out the principles of procedural fairness m NZ Food 
P . u . u ·z 122 rocessmg nwn v m ever . 
The requirement for procedural fairness does not however mean that the Court 
should subject the employer's investigation to "minute or pedantic scrutiny", but that 
the Court should ensure that the employee has been treated reasonably and with 
fairness during the whole process leading up to and including the dismissal 123 . 
Although there are elements to procedural fairness, sometimes the Court will 
simply look at the facts as a whole to determine whether the dismissal was 
unjustifiable. As the Court of Appeal stated that when considering a case of 
unjustifiable dismissal 124: 
" ... it is often convenient to distinguish between procedural and substantive 
unfairness. But there is no sharp dichotomy. In the end the overall question is 
whether the employee has been treated fairly in all the circumstances" 
121 Phillip Bartlett and others Brookers Employment Law (Brookers, Wellington, 2000) para ER103.08 
from htpt:!!J upiter. brookers. co. nz (last accessed 09/11/2002) 
122 NZ Food Processing Union v Unilever NZ Ltd [1990) l NZILR 35 
123 Air New Zealand Ltd v Sutherland [1993) 2 ERNZ 10, 18 
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C Misconduct and Incapacity 
It has therefore been established that whenever an employer dismisses an 
employee, he or she must do so in a procedurally fair manner. The Courts have set 
out that when the party who is claiming the unjustified dismissal has gone beyond the 
mere making of the claim so as to establish a prima facie case of unjustified dismissal, 
the onus then shifts to the employer to justify the dismissal 125 . It is then up to the 
Court to decide whether the dismissal was in fact justified. Although this must be 
done on a case-by-case basis there remains the need of the conduct or capacity to be 
of a sufficiently serious nature so as to justify the dismissal. 
The employer does not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
alleged misconduct was done by the employee, but that they based their decision on a 
reasonably founded belief, honestly held, that on a balance of probabilities the 
misconduct took place 126 • 
As Phillip Bartlett and others note, there can be a number of reasons for 
dismissing an employee ranging from serious offences warranting summary dismissal 
to less serious offences requiring warnings before the dismissal takes place 127 . It is 
not always clear what behaviour will justify a summary misconduct, as the Court of 
Appeal noted in Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil NZ Ltd128: 
"Definition [of the kind of conduct that will justify summary dismissal] is not 
possible, for it is always a matter of degree. Usually what is needed is conduct that 
deeply impairs or is destructive of that basic confidence or trust that is an essential of 
the employment relationship" 
The following are different types of conduct and capacity with varying levels 
of seriousness, which are used to justify summary dismissal. Through these examples 
the parameters of unjustifiable dismissal can be seen. 
124 Nelson Air ltd v NZALPA [1994] 2 ERNZ 665,668 per Hardie Boys J (CA) 
125 Airline Stewards etc IUW v Air New Zealand Ltd [ 1990] 3NZLR 549, 552 (CA) 126 Airline Stewards etc JUW v Air New Zealand Ltd, above, 553-556 
127 Phillip Bartlett and others Brookers Employment Law (Brookers, Wellington, 2000) para ER103.09 
from htpt:I/Jupiter.brookers.co.nz (last accessed 09/11/2002) 
128 Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 483,487 per Hardie Boys J (CA) 
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1. Serious Misconduct 
As the title suggests the misconduct of the employee must be serious in nature 
before a dismissal will be justified. An example of such misconduct is a theft; this 
will be dealt with under the following heading of 'dishonesty'. Other likely 
misconduct is an assault or violence directed against a co-worker or supervisor. 
However not all assaults would justify a dismissal. The misconduct must be 
sufficient as to deeply impair or destroy the trust and confidence of the employment 
relationship. This would occur in more serious cases of assault, or where the 
employee has breached the employers' trust and confidence by leakjng confidential 
information, documents or trade secrets. This would result in the destruction of the 
trust necessary for an employment relationship and would likely make summary 
dismissal justifiable. 
The misconduct may also be a breach of the employee's work rules. Some 
examples of these are possession of drugs, intoxication at work, unauthorised 
possession of company property, or wilful destruction of company property. As 
Phillip Bartlett and others note, a breach of work rules will not necessarily establish 
substantive justification for a dismissal. This is because the test is whether the 
dismissal was unjustifiable, not whether there was a breach of work rules or some 
other contractual term 129 . 
Misconduct outside of work hours has also been held to justify a dismissal 
where it undermines the employer's confidence in the employee to such an extent as 
to destroy the trust necessary for the employment relationship, or where the 
employee's actions bring the employer into disrepute 130. Examples of such 
misconduct are fraud 131 , assault 132, vandalism 133, or a conviction for a criminal 
offence. 
2. Dishonesty 
129 Phillip Bartlett and others, above, para ER 103.11 
130 Phillip Bartlett and others, above, para ER 103.11 
131 NZ Bank Officers IUOW v BNZ Ltd (1984] ACJ 641 
132 Northern Hotel etc IUOW v Premier Liquor Retailers Ltd (1990] 1 NZILR 357 
133 Mussen v NZ Clerical Workers Union (1991] 3 ERNZ 368 
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The act of dishonesty most likely to occur in the workplace is theft. If an 
employee steals from his or her employer it is likely to destroy the trust and 
confidence necessary to the employment relationship. However not all acts of theft 
will result in a justified dismissal. As his Honour Hardie Boys J pointed out in BP Oil 
it is a matter of degree. If, for example, the employee had taken a pen from their 
place of employment without authorisation and with the intention to keep it , while it 
may strictly speaking be theft, it is not of such a serious degree as to justify a 
dismissal. 
For more trivial acts of dishonesty a warning may be appropriate, howe er if 
the employee decides that a summary dismissal is the appropriate reaction then the act 
of dishonesty must be of a sufficiently serious degree as to warrant summary 
dismissal. For example in Maxwell v Taranaki Sawmills Ltd1 34 an employee v as 
summarily dismissed after eating five biscuits from an open packet on a table in the 
staff cafeteria because it was in violation of the house rules . The Tribunal found that 
though the dismissal was procedurally fair it was an "extravagant overreaction" and 
was an unjustified dismissal 135 . 
As with acts of serious misconduct, serious allegations of theft might involve 
police investigations and criminal charges 136. In this case for the purposes of 
procedural fairness the employer should not make his or her final decision until the 
investigations are complete. In Ropiha v Weddel Crown Westfield Ltd1 37 it was held 
that a dismissal for alleged unauthorised possession of company property was 
unjustified. 
3. Unsatisfactory Work Performance 
If an employee's work performance is unsatisfactory they must be warned and 
given an opportunity to improve, with further training if necessary. If this process 
was not followed a dismissal would be likely to be unjustified because of lack of 
procedural fairness. 
134 Maxwell v Taranaki Sawmills Ltd 2/4/01 , WT24/0l 
135 Maxwell v Taranaki Sawmills Ltd, above, per K Johnston (adjudicator) 
136 Phillip Bartlett and others Brookers Employment Law (Brookers, Wellington, 2000) para ER103 .12 
from htpt:!/Jupiter.brookers.co.11z (last accessed 09/11/2002) 
137 Ropiha v Weddel Crown Westfield Ltd [1989] l NZILR 668 
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The case of Trotter v Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd138 sets out some of the inquiries 
that a court should make in determining whether a dismissal for unsatisfactory work 
performance can be justified. These are based around the fairness and reasonableness 
of the employer's process leading up to the dismissal and the opportunities given to 
the employee to improve. 
4. Injury or Illness 
While an employee who can no longer work because of injury or illness 
cannot have their employment terminated immediately simply because they are 
unable to work, an employer also does not need to hold their position open for them 
forever. The inquiry into whether a dismissal is justified will be what was fair and 
reasonable in all the circumstances. In Motor Machinists Ltd v Craig the Court 
summarised the position when an employee is dismissed for an injury or illness: 139 
" ... where illness or injury occurs which prevents the employee from returning to work, 
the employer is not necessarily bound to hold that employee's job open indefinitely. 
However, if the employer chooses to dismiss, its action must be justified at the time ... 
That is, the employer must have substantive reasons for the dismissal, and must show 
that the procedure it followed was fair. This ensures the employee is not dismissed 
without the opportunity to provide information, such as medical reports, to prevent the 
employer taking such action, while at the same time allowing the employer to end the 
contract without needing to establish that the contract was frustrated" 
Where the illness or injury has resulted from a breach of the employer's duties 
a claim can be made for loss of earnings even where the dismissal was justified140. 
Illnesses that can render a person unfit for work include stress 141 . 
5. Other Reasons 
Phillip Bartlett and others identify some other reasons that may give rise to a 
dismissal 142. These include conflict of interest, personal and/or unprofessional 
138 Trotter v Telecom Co,p of NZ Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 659 
139 Motor Machinists Ltd v Craig [ 1996] 2 ERNZ 585, 592 per Goddard CJ 
14° Commissioner of Police v Cartwright [2000] 2 ERNZ 106 (CA) 
141 See Commissioner of Police v Cartwright, above, and also Benge v A-G [2000] 2 ERNZ 234 142 Phillip Bartlett and others Brookers Employment Law (Brookers, Wellington, 2000) para ER103.15 
from htpt://Jupiter.brookers.co.nz (last accessed 09/11/2002) 
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relationships, repeated absenteeism or abandonment of work. It is also possible to 
dismiss an employee justifiably if there is a serious incompatibility between the 
employee and the employer. For example in Schlooz v NZ Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board1
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the dismjssal of an employee was held to be justified because she had 
created an inharmonious working environment to the extent that her supervisor was 
considering resignation. 
In general what is needed is misconduct that seriously impairs or destroys the 
relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and the employee. As with 
all dismissals the test remains, at present to be, that it will be justified if it was open to 
fair and reasonable employer in all the circumstances. 
D Redundancy 
Under the Labour Relations Act 1987 redundancy was defined m section 
184(5) as a situation where 
"a worker's employment is terminated by the employer, the termination being 
attributable, wholly or mainly, to the fact that the position filled by the worker is, or 
will become, superfluous to the needs of the employer" 
No definition of redundancy is included in the Employment Contracts Act or the 
Employment Relations Act. It is therefore up to employers and employees to create 
an agreement about redundancy in the employment contract. 
A redundancy is not an unjustified dismissal if it was done for genuine 
redundancy reasons 144. There are two factors that the court will usually look at to 
determine whether the redundancy constituted an unjustifiable dismissal: the 
genuineness of the redundancy and whether the dismissal was carried out in a 
procedurally fair manner145 . 
143 Schlooz v NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board [1991) 3 ERNZ 728 
144 GN Hale & Son Ltd v Wellington etc Caretakers etc IUOW [ 1991) l NZLR 151, 155 (CA) 
145 Phillip Bartlett and others, above, para 13.17 
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The form that a business decides to take is determjned by the management, 
and the Court has held that it is not for the courts to substitute their business 
judgement for that of the employers 146• However the courts are able to review the 
decisions that the employer makes and to decide whether or not the decision to make a 
redundancy was a genuine one. For example in NZ Nurses Union v Air NZ Ltd1 41 the 
Employment Court decided that although Ajr New Zealand had established that there 
was a genujne commercial need to reduce costs, it had not established that there was a 
genuine commercial need to make redundancies. This does however appear to be the 
court substituting its own business views for that of the employer. On strict 
interpretation once a court has decided that there was a genuine commercial reason to 
reduce costs, they should not then decide how those cost cuts should come about. 
Even if the redundancy is made for genuine reasons, it must be done in a 
procedurally fair manner. In the latest case under the Employment Relations Act on 
redundancy, Coutts Cars v Baguley, the Court of Appeal has continued along the lines 
of Aoraki. The Court has confirmed that the relationship between the employer and 
employee rests on the employment agreement, that the duty to consult is the same as 
required under Aoraki (desirable but not always necessary, such as in mass 
redundancies), the duty of good faith does not introduce any significantly different 
obligations than that which were implicit in the old legislation for redundancies and 
that compensation will only be paid if it was expressly provided for in the 
employment agreement 148• Commentators have stated that the Court in effect turned 
the clock back to the principles it established in several cases under the ECA 149. 
It is not clear why the Court of Appeal has continued to take this contractual 
approach under the Employment Relations Act, which has a markedly different object 
to that of the Employment Contracts Act. It does not seem to be in accord with the 
legislation. 
146 GN Hale & S011 Ltd v Wellington etc Caretakers etc IUOW, above, 155 
147 NZ Nurses Union v Air NZ Ltd [1992] 3 ERNZ 548 
148 Coutts Cars Ltd v Baguley [2002] 2 NZLR 533, 545 per Gault J (CA) 
149 Phillip Bartlett and others, above, para 103.22A 
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X PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE CHANGES 
A Proposed Test for Unjustified Dismissals 
As previous Courts have stated, it is not preferable to lay down rigid rules as 
to the definition of a word such as 'unjustifiable', however, it is necessary to give 
clear guidance as to what the Court should have regard to in making their decision. 
As the Court of Appeal appear to be taking a strict contractual interpretation of the 
Employment Relations Act, it may be necessary for Parliament to offer more guidance 
as to what their intentions are in relation to personal grievances. 
There should remain the requirement of conduct or capacity of the worker that 
is of a sufficient seriousness as to deeply impair or destroy the trust and confidence of 
the employment relationship. Anything less should not constitute a valid reason for 
dismissal. 
In accordance with the Interpretation Act 1999 the Courts should ascertain the 
meaning of the enactment from its text and in the light of its purpose 150. Given that 
the purpose of the legislation is to provide employment protection and to ensure that 
employee's do not have their employment termjnated without a valid reason, there 
should be a move away from the test being whether it was open to the fair and 
reasonable employer to dismiss the employee to being "the opinion of the Court" 151 . 
The Courts should be the ultimate judges in deciding whether the decision to dismiss 
was justified. Otherwise, if the decision of Oram is followed, an employer will be 
allowed to dismjss employees because it was open for him or her to do so, even if the 
decision was a harsh one to make. This does not promote employment protection, 
which is the purpose of the personal grievance provisions, or promote the principles 
or objects of the Employment Relations Act, which are to encourage trust and 
confidence in employment relationships. It in fact frustrates the principles of the 
ERA. It is possible that the Court of Appeal will take a different approach to 
misconduct cases than it has to redundancy cases, however thisseems unlikely. 
150 Interpretation Act 1999 section 5(1) 
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In 1980 Dr Mathieson referred to the Court's failure "to do what Parliament 
intended that it should do, namely construct and develop a body of case law that 
would enhance predictability and reduce the number of references actually reaching 
the Court"
152
. The vague test of a fair and reasonable employer has done little to aid 
the predictability of cases since 1980, however it would be very difficult to create a 
test that was sufficiently descriptive so as to be helpful, without making it too 
arbitrary. The most appropriate test is to look at all the circumstances of the case, 
because every case is different and all must tum on its own facts. However, in doing 
so the courts should have regard to the non-exhaustive list made by Williamson J in 
Fletcher Construction, which includes the conduct of the parties, the nature of the 
industry and its customs and practices, ILO Conventions and good industrial practice, 
which includes some consideration of social and moral attitudes 153 • 
The nature of the misconduct must be of a sufficient seriousness as to deeply 
impair or destroy the trust and confidence of the employment relationship. However 
the Courts should also decide whether the employer could have adopted a different 
approach, for example by demoting or moving the employee if the misconduct were 
not sufficiently serious. In a case where the misconduct was not sufficiently serious, 
or highlighted a fault within the companies own system the dismissal should be held 
to be unjustified. For example in the case of Oram, Mr Oram's failure to check the 
identity of the person in the photograph was not sufficient so as to deeply impair or 
destroy the employment relationship, it seemed more to be a mistake that highlighted 
the newspapers inadequate system for checking items before publishing them. The 
dismissal should have been held to have been unjustified, as the employer should have 
given him a warning, or moved him to less important news items. This is especially 
the case since Mr Oram had an otherwise unblemished work record. 
In order to give effect to the purpose of the personal grievance provisions, 
namely employment protection, the Courts need to return to a benevolent 
interpretation of unjustified dismissals, so that the dismissal is only justified by a valid 
reason due to a sufficiently serious act of misconduct or incapacity of the employee. 
151 Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction [1983) ACJ 653, 666 per Williamson J 
152 Dr Mathieson "The lawyer, industrial conflict and the right to fire" [1980) NZLJ 216, 218 
153 Wellington Road Transport Union v Fletcher Construction, above, 666 
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B Other Legislative Change 
The personal gnevance procedures have been pushed out to include most 
employees. Presently workers have a relatively secure position under employment 
legislation. This however may not be maintained if the Court of Appeal continues to 
take a restrictive and conservative approach to employment relations, favouring the 
employer and the employment agreement. 
An amendment should be enacted to abolish the ninety day rule, as that is one 
of the remaining legislative limitations on a workers ability to invoke the personal 
grievance procedures. It seems incongruous to have a six-year statute of limitations 
for tort actions, but only ninety days to raise a personal giievance for employment. 
Given that employment is of such great importance to most people, being their sole 
source of financial income, ninety days seems too short a period of time. It is unfair 
on employees to be so constricted in their ability to raise a personal grievance. Over 
the previous 23 years Parliament has steadily increased the availability of the personal 
grievance jurisdiction to cover more and more employees. The final step should be 
taken in giving employees their rights by increasing the time period that an employee 
must raise their grievance. 
According to the current situation, if someone was to back into person A's car, 
they would have six years in which to bring their action, however if person A was 
dismissed, they would have only ninety days to raise a grievance with their employer. 
This does not take into account the intense feelings that are likely to be involved with 
a dismissal, especially if that person believes that the dismissal was unjustified. It 
puts too heavy a burden on the dismissed employee who must deal not only with a 
dismissal and trying to find another job and manage the financial side of life, but in 
addition must also raise the grievance with the person who has just dismissed them. 
Although it could be argued that because employment is so important and 
because reinstatement is one of the key remedies for an unjustified dismissal then it is 
only fair to both parties for the issue to be raised and resolved quickly. Also it should 
be noted that the employee only has to raise the issue with their employer within 
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ninety days and they then have three years to bring the actual complaint. It is also 
necessary to have time limitations on these matters so that issues are dealt with 
quickly and resolved without dragging on for years on end. Therefore, if an employee 
wants to be reinstated they should perhaps be required to raise their grievance within 
ninety days, but the time period should be longer for reimbursement or compensation. 
Though there is not scope in this paper for a full discussion on redundancy, 
there needs to be reform in this area. Redundancies are very different to other 
dismissals because there is no conduct or capacity to link the dismissal to the 
employee. By definition a redundancy removes the position not the person. For this 
reason it does not fit, therefore, to have redundancy as part of unjustified dismissals. 
Redundancies should have an Act governing the requirements of a redundancy, the 
employer's duties and what compensation an employee should be entitled to. 
XI CONCLUSION 
The 'unjustified' principle in employment Jaw has evolved from its roots in 
the Common Law action for wrongful dismissal to the substantial and developed area 
of statute law and case Jaw now available to dismissed employees. 
The Industrial Relations Act was a substantial change in labour law for 
workers, granting rights not previously available. The incorporation of unjustified 
dismissals meant that workers were able to take a grievance for more than 
compensation for Jack of the contractual or reasonable notice period, but for 
acknowledgement that the employer was not justified in dismissing the worker and 
that they were therefore entitled to reimbursement, reinstatement or compensation. 
However the worker was nonetheless restricted by the necessity to be covered by an 
award or agreement and be a union member. There was then the further restriction 
that only the union representative could bring the personal grievance, although there 
was also a right of appeal against the union's decision. 
The government at the time was clearly concerned with the rate of strikes and 
the disruptions they were causing. They gave no indkation, however, as to why they 
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backtracked on their previous comments on not wanting to restrict an employer' s 
ability to hire and fire. Though, since the 1970 legislation changed the position of 
unjustly dismissed employees so little, it was necessary, in order to curtail the number 
of strikes, to introduce measures that could do just that. It appears from the 
Parliamentary debates that little consideration was given to the introduction of the 
word 'unjustified' in place of 'wrongful' 
These restrictions were lessened with the introduction of the LRA which 
substantialJy extended the provisions of the action, not only by abolishing the need to 
be covered by an award or agreement but also by providing a detailed and 
comprehensive legislative framework for the unjustified dismissal and unjustifiable 
action provisions. Though the worker remained limited by the need for union 
membership and for the union representative to bring the grievance. The provisions 
were given flesh under the LRA and rather than being almost an afterthought, they 
constitute a main part of the labour legislation. 
However, during compulsory umon membership the requirement of 
membership was not a burden , as all workers had to belong to a union regardless of 
whether or not they had a personal grievance claim. 
It was only with the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act, with its 
emphasis on t.he individual and the new right economic theory that employees were 
able to bring their grievance themselves. However, the new Act was harsh in its own 
ways, restricting the grievance by needing it to be raised within ninety days of the 
grievance occurring. This shows the influence of the new right and the pro employer 
stance that the Act takes. Though the employee finally had the personal grievance 
procedures vested in them, the limitation on that right is a great one. 
While the ERA has aimed to extend the personal gnevance provisions to 
people actually working as employees through the new definition of an 'employee ' 
and the limitation on fixed term contracts, there still remains the restriction of the 
ninety day rule. With the current Court of Appeal, the legislation may not have gone 
far enough to satisfactorily protect people ' s employment, as the restrictive approach 
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of the Court of Appeal under the ECA has continued under the ERA, even though the 
two pieces of legislation are so clearly philosophically distinct. 
The current test for unjustified dismissals must be taken from the latest Court 
of Appeal decision, which stated that the question was whether the decision to dismiss 
was one that a fair and reasonable employer could have made, even if the decision 
was harsh. 
However, this test should be changed under the Employment Relations Act 
with its object to promote mutual trust and confidence in all aspects of the 
employment relationship. The current test fails to comply with this object as it allows 
harsh dismissals so long as they were within the range of possible decisions of a fair 
and reasonable employer. In order to promote the object of the Act, and the object of 
the personal grievance provisions, there needs to be a greater emphasis on 
employment protection and on the impact of the decision on the employee. For these 
reasons the test must be a neutral, objective standard where the Court relies on their 
own opinion as to whether the dismissal could be held to be justifiable. In doing so 
the Court should have regard to the conduct of both parties and balance the conflicting 
rights of the employee to employment security and the employer to organise their 
business. If the reasonable employer is used as the benchmark, it pushes the test too 
far in favour of the employer. A neutral standard is fair to both sides by favouring 
neither. 
The underlying principle must be that a person's employment can only be 
terminated for a valid reason connected with that person's misconduct or incapacity 
that is of a sufficiently serious nature. To accept a lesser standard would undermine 
employment protection in New Zealand. 
In order to promote employment protection and effective remedies for workers 
whose employment is unjustifiably terminated the ninety day limitation must be 
greatly extended. In its current state it puts too great a restriction on an employee in 
gaining redress for an unjustified dismissal. 
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